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Executive Summary 
This report deals with a series of Indonesian military documents that were 
passed to the West Papua Project (WPP) in early 2011.1 The documents 
provide remarkable insights into how the Indonesian military (Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia – TNI), operates within the disputed territory of West 
Papua (disputed, that is, between the vast majority of Papuans and the 
Indonesian government), and how they view West Papuan civil society. The 
documents reveal the names and activities of Indonesian intelligence agents; 
describe how traditional Papuan communities are monitored; and include a 
detailed analysis of both the West Papuan armed guerrilla groups and the 
non-violent civil society organisations which promote self-determination. 
Identifying so many West Papuan leaders and others as “separatists”, these 
documents effectively show that support for independence is widespread and 
surprisingly well organised. West Papuans have long complained of living 
under an Indonesian military “occupation” and these documents go a long 
way to substantiating this claim. 
The authors of this report have sought to verify information contained in the 
documents where possible. Much of this information on individuals and 
Papuan organisations is already well known, although presented here more 
comprehensively in some respects than ever before. We can therefore be 
relatively confident that the documents are not fabricated or deliberately 
misleading, although they do contain inaccuracies, omissions and many 
obvious examples of false or misleading precision. Names of Indonesian 
intelligence agents, both Papuan and non-Papuan, are impossible to verify 
and have been left out of our report. We do believe, however, that the general 
modus operandi revealed in the documents is a fair representation of how the 
Indonesian military operates. As many diverse and disputed claims are made 
about the conflict in West Papua by the Indonesian and other governments, 
by international commentators and by the Papuans themselves, we believe 
that this information should be in the public sphere to increase understanding 
of this little-known, but intense, bitter and long-standing conflict. 
The report is split into two sections. The first deals with the 97 slide 
PowerPoint presentation entitled, Anatomy of Papuan Separatists. The 
presentation itself can be viewed at 
http://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict/research/west_papua_project.shtml. 
This section acts as a running commentary on the slide show, explaining and 
contextualising what is an intriguing exposition of the West Papuan armed 
liberation movement and its non-violent civilian counterpart. The forensic 
details of the Anatomy leave the reader in no doubt as to the level of military 
scrutiny under which the Papuans live. It shows just how seriously the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The West Papua Project, at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, The University of 
Sydney, has operated since 2000 as an academic think tank and research center examining 
the conflict in West Papua between the indigenous Melanesian people and the Indonesian 
state and its security forces. During this period the WPP has held many conferences, 
workshops and briefings, and its affiliates have produced a wide range of publications 
including books, scholarly articles and reports. 
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Indonesian forces take the threat of “separatism”, especially its attempts to 
reach out to an international audience. The presentation could accurately be 
renamed as an Anatomy of the Papuan Occupation. 
The second section deals with an assortment of other leaked documents that 
flesh out the day-to-day reality of living under Indonesian occupation. In both 
images and text the daily tasks of security force members are outlined as they 
maintain a close surveillance on communities of traditional Papuans. Details 
of Indonesian agents  - who they are, where they work, what information they 
can provide - are listed as small links in the heavy chain mesh of an 
occupation which has at its core the modern practice of “psychological 
warfare”, PSYOPS. This pernicious system of social control has created a 
pervasive atmosphere of terror amongst the Papuan population as their lives 
are manipulated by state actions and threatened with “black operations”. 
Unsolved, indeed uninvestigated, killings, beatings and rapes occur against a 
background of a rapidly changing demography as hundreds of thousands of 
non-Papuan Indonesians move into the province. Predominantly Muslim, the 
newcomers are adding another layer of tension and fear, as the Muslim-
Christian divide widens – taking its cue from the threatened growth of radical 
Islam in Java and elsewhere. 
PSYOPS, as practiced in West Papua, is analysed initially from a general 
perspective and then from the personal experience of several individual 
Papuans. As a tool of social control it has been effective in dividing the 
Papuan people, some of whom now form a Papuan elite that has prospered 
economically under the bureaucratic “reforms” enacted by the Indonesian 
government, particularly the creation of two provinces and some 23 new 
administrative regencies in Papua. However, these documents show that, 
despite PSYOPS and divide-and-rule administrative policies, there is a high 
degree of cohesion and unity amongst the West Papuan nationalist majority. 
Indeed, looking at the Papuan individuals identified in these documents it can 
be seen that West Papuan nationalism is spread throughout civil society, in 
the churches, youth groups, customary bodies and political organisations. Far 
from the desire for self-determination dying out, the younger generation of 
Papuan leaders is now stridently demanding the rights to which they are 
entitled by Indonesian law, albeit increasingly as a non-violent, civil resistance 
movement. 
These documents show that Indonesian rule over West Papua can be 
characterised as an ongoing military/police occupation. Inevitably this involves 
the systematic infliction of human rights abuses on a civilian population. Our 
report concludes that Australia should not be co-operating as it does with the 
TNI elite special forces, Kopassus, because it directly implicates the 
Australian army and taxpayer in the suffering of the Papuan people. And all 
Australian military aid to Indonesia should be seriously reconsidered while the 
military dominated system of occupation persists in Papua. The political and 
administrative reforms that have benefited so much of Indonesia since 1998 
need to be properly implemented in West Papua. Until then West Papua will 
remain a blight on Indonesia’s international reputation and a place of suffering 
for its indigenous Melanesian population.
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Introduction 
This report is based on a series of documents recently leaked into the public 
domain that relate to military and intelligence operations in West Papua.2 The 
most important is entitled Anatomy of Papuan Separatists and it gives 
observers unprecedented insight into how the Indonesian army views the 
situation there. Organised as a confidential briefing document, presumably for 
senior Indonesian military, political and government figures, it clarifies a 
situation that is generally regarded as opaque. Other documents relate to the 
use of Papuan and non-Papuan intelligence agents by the TNI and efforts by 
soldiers to socialise with Papuan village communities (these documents are 
analysed in the second section of this report). While the Indonesian 
government bans foreign journalists and researchers from Papua’s two 
provinces, now confusingly named Papua and West Papua, in an attempt to 
block information on the situation from reaching the outside world, here is a 
case where the Indonesians themselves are providing a frank and 
comprehensive assessment. While undated, the Anatomy document’s 
reference to US President Barack Obama suggests it was written, or at least 
finished, sometime after his election on November 4, 2008. 
Anatomy of Papuan Separatists is an extraordinary document in the form of 
an extended PowerPoint presentation. Produced by the TNI,3 it is a 
systematic and detailed analysis of the West Papuan political landscape, 
mapping who the various actors are and where they fit into a larger picture. 
Almost every leading West Papuan political and military player is included in 
this analysis – leaving one with the distinct impression that there is no other 
game in town except “separatism”. In fact the goal for most of the West 
Papuan leaders in this analysis is independence, which implies that this is 
also the desired outcome for the overwhelming majority of the Papuan people. 
So this document is both a study in “separatism” and a blueprint for a military 
occupation meant to combat that separatism. Separatism is shown to be not a 
rare sentiment held by the few, but rather the glue which binds together the 
West Papuan ethnic and political consciousness. We are given a valuable 
insight into how West Papua and its Indonesian occupation actually work. 
The Anatomy file comprises 97 slides and methodically works through the 
various ways in which the West Papuans confront the Indonesian state. In 
broad terms the conflict is split between military and political spheres, with 
some overlap. Both of these spheres are explored in remarkably frank detail. 
The military analysis of the “separatist” movement is the most detailed ever 
undertaken, or at least revealed publicly, and shows just how extensive the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 These documents have been referred to in a blog site on the internet dated January 30, 
2011 at www.nokenlama.blogspot.com/2011/01/kisah-tentang-kekerasan-seksual.html in an 
entry entitled “Story About Sexual Violence in West Papua [By] Army Personnel”, which refers 
to “an article titled An Anatomy of Separatists in Papua, [by] Maj. D. Arm Fence”.  The article 
was published by the Secretariat for Justice and Peace, Archdiocese Merauke, Papua. Some 
others of these documents have been quoted previously (see allannairn.com), although many 
appear to be new, or at least to have received no public analysis; hence this report. 
3 The author of the Anatomy document is named as Major Arm Fence D Marani. 
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armed opposition to Indonesian rule is. The Anatomy document provides 
details of 31 armed groups of the TPN (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional –the 
National Liberation Army), the military wing of the OPM (Organisasi Papua 
Merdeka—the Free Papua Movement) that are spread right across the two 
provinces (Papua and Papua Barat) that constitute the region referred to 
collectively in this report as West Papua. Rather than being the ragtag bunch 
of malcontents - which the OPM/TPN are usually portrayed as — this 
Anatomy shows them to be a relatively cohesive and deeply entrenched 
resistance army, highly committed to achieving their goal of independence 
from Indonesia, even though the Anatomy often seems to imply that all the 
dozens of groups it identifies across a 40 year period are still functioning 
pretty much as when first identified. 
Before proceeding with analysis of the document we have three general 
comments.  
First, we wish to highlight the pervasiveness of the phenomenon of 
“separatism” as seen from the (Indonesian military) author’s point of view. 
Demands for dialogue; the “return” of Special Autonomy to Jakarta, and for  
demilitarisation, improved human rights, an end to discrimination, economic 
marginalisation and environmental devastation in West Papua — all amount 
to only “separatism” in the Anatomy. And separatism is viewed as a legitimate 
thing for the military to attack; separatists are enemies of the Indonesian 
state, and therefore enemies of the military and the police. There is no 
attempt to understand where this sentiment comes from, just to identify its 
existence to be targeted for destruction. That there are so many separatists 
does not seem to faze the author(s) of the Anatomy; just to reinforce his 
(their) sense of mission. 
There is little discussion of those Papuans who are not separatists. There are 
undoubtedly Papuans who have thrown in their lot with Indonesia, one of 
whom is identified in the Anatomy, Franzalbert Joku. He is the only person of 
the hundreds listed who has “returned to Indonesia”. Joku is a well-known 
former independence activist who has given up the struggle as a hopeless 
cause and works hard to convince other “separatists” to do the same. Later in 
this report we will explore Joku’s views further as well as those of other 
prominent Papuans who have eschewed the struggle for freedom. 
Second, it is noteworthy that there are so many “separatists” identified in the 
Anatomy, and that they include so many of the most prominent people from 
the three generations since the Indonesian takeover of Papua in 1962-3 is 
striking. While most outside observers dismiss the chance of achieving 
independence as remote if not impossible, given the power and determination 
of the Indonesian state and the comparative weakness of the Papuans, many 
Papuans do not. They are fully committed to the struggle. In fact these 
documents show that the younger generation, those in their 20s and 30s, are 
as committed as the older generations. Together the Papuans listed in this 
document represent most of the current leading figures in West Papuan 
society. The Anatomy shows how seriously the Indonesian state and military 
consider the threat of separatism, and indeed it places the people named 
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under grave threat of targeted assassination. Some of them have indeed 
already been killed since the publication of the document (for instance OPM 
leader Kelly Kwalik). This has led some informed readers of the Anatomy to 
describe it as a “hit list” of people targeted for removal. 
Thirdly, this document tells us how the Indonesian military views the West 
Papuan political structure. To an outside observer it is hard to grasp how all 
the multiple military, social and political Papuan groups relate to each other. 
Here this complex situation is laid out with surprising clarity: there are 
traceable lines of authority and engagement — even between various 
“factions” and geographically isolated groups. One reason that Jakarta has 
given for refusing to negotiate with the West Papuans over the myriad 
problems that beset the province is that “we do not know who to negotiate 
with”.4 This document undermines that pretext. 
 
Section 1: Analysis of Anatomy of Papuan Separatists 
There is no index to the Anatomy, but the document can be broken down as 
follows: 
Overview        p.2 
Separatist Development      p.5 
PEMKA OPM Faction, 20 Groups     p.6 
MARVIC OPM Faction, 11 Groups    p.28 
Territorial War Commands      p.42 
Known Activities of GSP/B      p.42 
General Structure of GSP/P     p.45 
Structure of Political Organizations    p.46 
Papuan Separatists Foreign Networks    p.54 
Bio-data and Brief History of Key Papuans   p.63 
Known Activities of GSP/P      p.96 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Private conversation with senior Indonesian officials accompanying President Yudhoyono on 
his visit to Australia, Sydney University, 8 March, 2010. 
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The document starts with the statement that the situation in Papua is 
“generally conducive” [for Indonesia] but that “Papuan separatist groups 
continue to voice their aspirations”.5 It goes on to explain what these 
aspirations are and what constitutes “separatist groups”. Their alleged tactics 
are to highlight the failure of Special Autonomy in Papua and the injustice of 
the Act of Free Choice, two of the most significant actions undertaken by the 
Indonesian government during their period in control of West Papua. The 
supposed goal of these tactics is to discredit the Indonesian government and 
demand a referendum on the future of West Papua – or, in the Indonesian 
military’s words, to achieve the break-up of the Republic of Indonesia. 
The Act of Free Choice (AOFC) was a semi-farcical poll taken in 1969 under 
nominal UN supervision where 1025 handpicked “representatives” of the 
Papuan people voted unanimously for official inclusion of the former Dutch 
territory of West New Guinea, by then named Irian Jaya and under Jakarta’s 
control since 1963, into Indonesia. The AOFC is widely seen by both West 
Papuans and outside observers as a gross injustice, which robbed the 
Papuans of their right to self-determination.  
Special Autonomy comprises the package of laws and regulations drawn up in 
2001 and subsequently whereby the Indonesian government appeared to give 
certain concessions to the West Papuans as a way of undermining 
widespread calls for independence. The package was only partially 
implemented and resulted in no real empowerment of the Papuan people; 
rather, it accelerated corruption, increased inward migration by Indonesians of 
Malay descent and served to strengthen the Indonesian military occupation. 
Special Autonomy was “returned” to Jakarta by the West Papuan people in 
July 2010 through their representatives in the peak official Papuan political 
organisation, the MRP (Majelis Rakyat Papua — the all-Papuan upper house 
of the provincial parliament in Papua) but Jakarta has not yet accepted it 
back. 6 
That the Anatomy directly links protest against the fraudulent AOFC and failed 
Special Autonomy (known by Papuans as Otsus—Otonomi Khusus) with 
Papuan separatism seems to dismiss the possibility of a “middle ground” 
position. Such a position might encompass the views of Papuans who may be 
agreeable to living within the Indonesian Republic but are deeply unhappy 
about the results of Otsus and believe that the AOFC should be 
acknowledged as a charade perpetrated on the Papuan people by the 
Indonesians with the willing assistance of the United Nations and the 
international community, particularly the USA. So the tone set for this 
document is clear from the beginning – it reflects the unambiguous military 
and nationalist view that all those who dispute the status quo in West Papua 
are “separatists” – akin to traitors and legitimate enemies of the Indonesian 
military. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Anatomy of Papuan Separatists, p.2 
6 As of 2011 there are two MRPs – one for each of the two Papuan provinces. 
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Slide 3 notes that there are 114 TNI military posts along the 760 km border 
with Papua New Guinea (PNG). This is new information and contrasts starkly 
with PNG’s very poorly policed border region where grossly under-resourced 
PNG Defence Force posts are maintained only in Vanimo and Daru, the two 
coastal towns at either end of the long joint border.7 This slide also conflates 
the populations of the two Indonesian provinces of Papua and West Papua, 
seeing them as containing a single group of (Papuan) people.8 This is how 
most West Papuans, and many outside observers, in fact consider the region 
— as the historical entity of West Papua. From this we can see that the TNI 
has the same view. 
The following Slide 4 acknowledges that the Papuan people are “easily 
influenced by separatist ideas” (i.e. that the desire for independence is a 
widely held one) but attribute this to a “lack of perception of nationality”. Most  
Papuans are indeed self-perceived Melanesians who cannot identify as 
Indonesians and feel entitled to their own land on this basis. There is also the 
acknowledgement that the issue of Otsus has sparked debate in Papuan 
society, “first and foremost, for the separatists”. This shows that the TNI 
acknowledges once again how widespread support for “separatism” actually 
is. The slide ends with a peevish comment blaming the Papuans for claiming 
that “every conflict in the community is always tied to the TNI with the hope 
that it will grab the attention of the international community”.9 This statement 
is true. The Papuans do tend to blame the TNI or the police for every conflict, 
but the reality is that the TNI and police do get involved in most conflicts in 
West Papua, even if they have not caused them. This statement also 
indicates that the TNI (and the Papuans) are acutely aware of the monitoring 
eye of the international community. 
 
Separatist Development 
Slide 5 provides the basic prism through which the “separatist” struggle is 
viewed and pursued — on the one hand through armed struggle, and on the 
other by “political groups”. Two passages are quoted in full here as they 
represent a full and frank assessment of the military strength of the OPM and 
how the TNI understands the West Papuan civil resistance to Indonesian rule 
to be organised: 
Armed groups consist of 2 groups (PEMKA and MARVIC) with strength of +/- 
1,129 people and mixed weapons numbering +/- 131 and grenades, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Anatomy of Papuan Separatists, p.3 
8 Of course there are now roughly equal numbers of Indonesian settlers and their 
descendants alongside the Papuans in both provinces. They feature very little in the 
Anatomy. 
9 Anatomy of Papuan Separatists, p.3 
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experienced and able to conduct a guerrilla war/survive in the forest, spread 
throughout almost every regency in Papua.10   
Political groups consist of Bintang Kejora (Morning Star) which has a strength 
of +/- 16,867 people, with capabilities in propaganda and political diplomacy, 
spread throughout Papua and outside of Papua. Clandestine network of 
separatist supporting bureaucrats (Papuan People’s Council 15 persons, 
House of Representatives 8 people, and regional governments 18 people). 
This is the most detailed assessment ever made of the actual armed strength 
of the OPM and a somewhat less reliable (and slightly mysterious) estimate of 
the “political” strength of the “separatist” or West Papuan nationalist 
movement. A “Bintang Kejora” (Morning Star) group is named by reference to 
the almost universally accepted Papuan independence flag devised in 1961, 
but this group, the West Papua National Authority, is often associated with the 
so-called 14 Star independence flag originally flown in 1988.11  
Most estimates of OPM numbers made in the past have been largely 
guesswork. OPM reports of its own strength are generally grossly inflated. 
The TNI’s Anatomy figures are backed up in Slides 6-27 which break down 
the different OPM commands — indicating their geographic areas of 
operation, leadership, number of members and armoury. 
It is interesting that the Anatomy divides the OPM into two distinct factions. 
The divide between the northern coastal commands and those of the interior 
is well understood; however never before so clearly delineated as in this 
document. MARVIC stands for “Marcus Victoria”, the name of the original 
OPM command under the control of Jacob Prai and Seth Rumkorem in the 
early 1970s. The two men fell out in 1976 and Prai started another OPM 
command, PEMKA (Pemulihan Keadilan: Restoration of Justice). The falling 
out seems to have been more personal than political – Prai took a second 
wife from Biak Island, Rumkorem’s homeland, which seemed to spark the 
bitter conflict between the two. MARVIC split along ethnic lines, the Biaks and 
coastal OPM staying with Rumkorem and the highlanders going with Prai. 
OPM history acknowledges this split,12 but does not emphasise it; the TNI 
obviously does, perhaps keen to exploit any division amongst their enemies. 
In any event the Anatomy pursues its analysis of the two groups in extenso. 
The map on Slide 6 of the Anatomy is significant and is reproduced here (see 
Figure 1). It shows the area of operations and strength of the 20 groups that 
make up, in the Anatomy’s view, the PEMKA faction of the OPM. The 
strongest group is under the command of Mathias Wenda, with 460 guerrillas 
and nine weapons. This is a well-known group that dwells in West Papua’s 
north border region, extending to the Bewani Mountains of PNG. The other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 A later estimate of OPM numbers in the Anatomy is 1,495. 
11 The best-known exile in the WPNA is its Foreign Affairs representative, Jacob Rumbiak, 
former prison colleague of Xanana Gusmao, who lives in Melbourne. 
12 See Jim Elmslie, Irian Jaya Under the Gun: Indonesian Economic Development versus 
West Papuan Nationalism, University of Hawaii Press, 2002, p.40, quoting an interview with 
John Otto Ondawame. 
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groups are spread throughout the country with the exception of the northern 
coastal areas. Several groups are described as having fewer than 20 
members, including the late Kelly Kwalik’s group, which operates in the 
Amungme tribal area around the Freeport copper and gold mine. This is a 
surprising force estimate as Kwalik, who was killed by Brimob (Mobile 
Brigade) police in December 2009, was one of the most active and famous 
OPM commanders. He had led his command since the 1970s and had carried 
out numerous operations over the years, claiming (and generally 
acknowledged as earning) the title Supreme Commander of the OPM. This 
would appear to be an underestimation of the forces that Kwalik led and is a 
warning to the reader that the figures in the Anatomy should be taken as 
indicative only. 
 
Figure 1: Slide 6, Anatomy of Papuan Separatists 
Indeed all the figures and associated information in the Anatomy should be 
taken as indicative, but also as an apparently honest attempt by the author to 
provide realistic estimates. The nature of the conflict makes it difficult to be 
precise about exact numbers, as the Anatomy has tried to do, if merely 
because of the ebb and flow of people involved in the movement over time. 
There is also a considerable grey area in deciding what constitutes a 
seasoned guerrilla fighter as opposed to a new recruit, temporary fighter or 
even a “camp follower”.  
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Slide 7 is also reproduced here (Figure 2) as it shows the TNI’s conception of 
the West Papuan nationalist or “separatist” struggle: its strategies and goals. 
The overarching goal is said to be “referendum” – demand for a replay of the 
flawed 1969 Act of Free Choice. There is a direct link here to “Foreign 
Involvement”, implying that the political and military actions engaged in by the 
“separatists” are pitched, at least in part, to an international audience. Like the 
long struggle in East Timor, the Indonesian state will never be defeated 
militarily on the ground, but in the arena of world opinion the likely outcome is 
not so clear. 
 
Figure 2: Slide 7, Anatomy of Separatists. The bottom of the slide, 
irreproducible here, reads “(Organizational Base of Papua Taskforce)” 
The next 20 slides contain “bio-data” on each PEMKA OPM command and its 
leader. This includes some background on individual commanders as well as 
lists of activities – military attacks, flag raisings and secret meetings. The first 
slide is for Kelly Kwalik and his group of OPM/TPN fighters. As previously 
mentioned, Kwalik was killed by Indonesian police on December 16, 2009. 
They were arresting him in a late night raid after recent killings on the 
Freeport mine road. He was shot while “resisting arrest”,13 in what many 
believe was a targeted assassination. Kwalik’s “bio-data” does not record his 
death; other OPM leaders in the Anatomy who have been killed or died have 
a rough cross scrawled over their images. This seems to indicate that the 
document was written (or last updated) before December 16, 2009. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 “We Had to Kill Kwalik Say Indonesian Police,” Jakarta Globe, 17 December 2009. 
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Kwalik’s bio data allows us to assess the quality of information supplied, as he 
was the best-known OPM/TPN commander. There is no mention of Kwalik’s 
most famous action – the 1996 kidnapping of a group of European and 
Indonesian scientists. And he is attributed with the killing of three Freeport 
employees (including two Americans) on August 31, 2002. These killings were 
highly contentious – Kwalik always denied his involvement. Eventually 
Antonius Wamang and several other Papuans were convicted of the murders 
in a trial some observers described as a farce. Serious questions still remain 
about who actually coordinated the attack, with early suspicions of TNI 
complicity never properly addressed.14 Nevertheless the bio-data on Kwalik, 
and presumably the other OPM commanders and their groups, can be seen to 
have considerable grounding in known fact, even if condensed to fit into a one 
page summary. The bio-data on each group therefore provides important 
information on what the individual OPM/TPN commands actually consist of. 
Slide 28, reproduced below, shows the “Disposition, Composition and 
Strength of GSP/B Markas Victoria (MARVIC) group”.15 There are 11 groups 
consisting of 403 persons with 53 guns and one grenade. These groups are, 
on the whole, smaller and less active than the PEMKA groups. The largest 
group is the Sarmi command under Silas Awete, although no activity is 
recorded for this group since 2004. Three commands have no bio-data; their 
files containing only the statement “there have been no conspicuous actions 
as of yet”. 
 
Figure 3: Slide 28, Anatomy of Papuan Separatists 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See S. Eben Kirksey and Andreas Harsono. “Criminal Collaborations? Antonius Wamang 
and the Indonesian Military in Timika”, South East Asia Research 16 (2) 2008, pp165-197 
15 GSP: Gerakan Separatis Bersenjata—Armed Separatist Movement  
	   	   	  
	   	   12	  
	  
The most active group appears to be that of Hans (Richard) Uri Yuweni’s 
group, with 31 men, ten guns and one pistol. Yuweni is described as “the High 
Commander of West Papuan guerrillas although he has not been 
acknowledged as such by PEMKA, especially Mathias Wenda”. Yuweni was 
appointed Supreme Commander of the OPM/TPN by the West Papua 
National Coalition for Liberation in 2008. The lack of recorded action by these 
commands, but the recognition of their continued existence, can probably be 
attributed to the fact that the regions in which they operate and live are far 
more densely populated by Indonesian migrants than the regions where 
PEMKA groups operate. The terrain of the coastal areas is also much more 
accessible and less remote than the mountainous interior, making clandestine 
guerrilla activity more difficult. Most are also far removed from the PNG 
border, rendering that relative safe-haven inaccessible. 
Slide 42 (see Figure 4) amalgamates the information provided on MARVIC 
and PEMKA guerrilla groups to provide an overall picture of the “Territorial 
War Commands (KODAP) GSP/B”, which is shown below. There are ten 
KODAPs that cover virtually all of West Papua. The leader of each KODAP is 
named, including such well known, long serving commanders as Kwalik, 
Bernadus Mawen, Hans Uri Joweni (Yuweni) and Tadius Yogi. This map 
proves what the OPM has long claimed: that there is a longstanding guerrilla 
network that is relatively well organised and which operates across the whole 
country. 
 
Figure 4: Slide 42, Anatomy of Separatists 
Slide 43 lists the OPM/TPN’s “Known Activities”: 
	   	   	  
	   	   13	  
	  
- planned attacks on TNI/Polri posts 
- intimidating/terrorizing the community that is against them 
- secret meetings to set strategy and plan attacks 
- circulating pamp[h]lets to gain community support 
- recruiting OPM/TPN members 
- flying the Morning Star flag to grab the attention of the international 
community. 
 
The international community is again mentioned here as an audience for 
OPM/TPN actions, although most flag raisings are performed as a ritual by 
West Papuans who passionately believe in the justness of their struggle as a 
reaffirmation of their sense of solidarity and purpose. Grabbing the attention of 
the international community is clearly not the only reason the flag is raised, 
although it was this very idea on flag raising to grab international attention that 
prompted President SBY to issue PP 77 in 2007, a regulation later used to jail 
more Papuans for flag raising. 
There is also much debate on the degree to which OPM groups terrorise “the 
community that is against them”. There have been well-recorded clashes 
between different factions of the OPM going back to the 1976 Markas Victoria 
split. There have also been accusations of criminal behaviour by OPM/TPN 
commands. However it is not known how much of the Papuan community is 
against the OPM/TPN, a necessary corollary of this “known” activity. 
Anecdotal evidence and the personal experience of the present authors would 
suggest that a large proportion of the population favours independence from 
Indonesia, even if some doubt that this will ever come about. There are also, 
obviously, a group of West Papuans who are currently benefiting from 
Indonesian rule, such as Franzalbert Joku, discussed above and later, and 
the two provincial governors, the 30-plus bupatis and the Papuan civil 
servants staffing the rapidly escalating number of regencies. How much of the 
Papuan community supports these pro-Indonesian leaders and opposes the 
programmes and goals of the OPM is beyond the scope of this report, except 
to reiterate that all our research and feedback indicate overwhelming Papuan 
support for the OPM and its chief aim: independence for West Papua. 
 
Disposition and Structure of Papuan Separatist Political 
Movements (GSP/P) 
The Anatomy now moves from the military realm to the political. The 
organisational structure reproduced below (see Figure 5) from Slide 45 
entitled “Central Structure GSP/P” also shows how the military wing of the 
OPM fits in with the political, non-violent West Papuan organisations. The 
OPM/TPN is shown as having two Commanders-in-Chief; Hans Uri Joweni for 
the MARVIC faction and Mathias Wenda for PEMKA. This neatly unifies the 
OPM in a single command structure, even if some disputes between MARVIC 
and PEMKA remain unresolved. Commander in Chief of the TPN is shown as 
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Joweni, although, as we have noted, this may not be accepted by Wenda and 
PEMKA. Both factions are shown as under the nominal authority of Edison 
Waromi, Executive President of the WPNA (West Papuan National Authority). 
The importance of this diagram is that this is how the TNI sees the “separatist” 
chain of command. It clearly puts Edison Waromi in a position of 
acknowledged authority together with the WPNA, the most recognised 
umbrella organisation for civil resistance groups on the ground in West 
Papua. This is what the leadership of the WPNA, such as Foreign Affairs 
representative, Jacob Rumbiak, have long claimed. The other major umbrella 
organisations, the WPNCL (West Papua National Coalition for Liberation), 
disputes this, although obviously the author of the Anatomy does not. 
 
Figure 5: Slide 45, Anatomy of Separatism 
 
The nine slides that follow show the organisational structures of the main 
Papuan political bodies. These organisations fit into the “Central Structure 
GSP/P” chart illustrated, which represents a “master plan” of West Papuan 
civil society. Everybody in these charts, which include most West Papuan civil 
society leaders, is considered a “separatist”, and therefore a traitor and 
enemy of the TNI and Indonesian state. This amounts to branding almost the 
whole (with the exception of those discussed above) of the West Papuan 
people as enemies. This is a very dangerous assessment by the TNI. Ben 
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Kiernan, renowned scholar of the Cambodian genocide,16 has commented 
that West Papua constitutes a “possible case” for a future genocide.17 
The three organisations that are highlighted in this assessment are the PAP 
(Papuan Customary Government), headed by Fadhal Al Hamid; the Papuan 
Presidium Council, under Thom Beanal, and the DAP (Papuan Customary 
Council), headed by Forkorus Yaboisembut. Other leading West Papuans 
named in this document include the (now deceased) former head of the MRP, 
the Papuan upper house of parliament, Agus Alua, and the heads of the three 
largest Protestant Papuan churches, Benny Giay, Herman Awom and 
Socrates Sofyan Yoman. The names and accompanying diagrams cover the 
whole of the country, including down to the different tribal groupings, the 
building blocks of Melanesian society. This is not the mapping of a few 
disgruntled individuals opposed to the status quo, but a detailed and 
comprehensive picture of an entire society in quiet, or not-so-quiet revolt 
against what they see as a foreign occupation. 
 
Foreign Support for Papuan Separatists 
Slides 56 to 62 of the Anatomy are lists of perceived foreign supporters of the 
Free Papua Movement. They are detailed and methodical, although also 
seriously flawed. While expatriate West Papuans, such as John Otto 
Ondawame, Rex Rumakiek, Jacob Rumbiak and Benny Wenda are 
accurately identified as pro-independence, the non-Papuan support list is hit-
and-miss. The “Foreign NGO Networks/Foreign Leaders in Support of Free 
Papua” list for Australia (Slide 60) contains both people who are long time 
activists as well as people who would not consider themselves as such at all. 
Number one on the list is Peter King, co-convener of the West Papua Project 
at Sydney University and one of the authors of this report, who could be 
legitimately considered a supporter of West Papuan independence. However, 
others on the list such as Richard Chauvel, Geoff Mulherin and Naomi 
Robson would probably not identify themselves with this aim. 
Lists for other countries are also haphazard, signalling confusion on the part 
of the Anatomy’s author, and consequent resort to a scattergun approach. 
With regard to the US and Ireland, large numbers of members of parliament 
and congresspersons are included because they have signed letters 
protesting against human rights abuses in West Papua, rather than actively 
promoting independence.18 The lists sometimes verge on the bizarre, such as 
naming PNG Prime Minister Michael Somare as an OPM supporter when he 
has pursed the opposite course - strong support for Indonesia - for decades. It 
is fair to say that the lists of foreign supporters have been compiled by naming 
people who have ever publicly expressed concern about the human rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16  See Ben Kiernan, A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur, 
Yale, New Haven, 2009. 
17 ABC Radio, “Late Night Live” with Philip Adams, 4 August 2009. 
18 See Slides 61 and 62 
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situation in West Papua, particularly if they are prominent people or 
politicians. Of course the lists also contain people who are strong supporters 
of a Free West Papua, but there are glaring omissions, such as Joe Collins, 
Secretary of the Australian West Papua Association, Sydney, who has 
campaigned for independence for years. 
 
Bio-data on Leading West Papuan Separatists 
Slides 64 to 95 contain the “Bio-data and Antecedents” of the leading West 
Papuan dissidents. It represents what the Indonesian military would consider 
a rogues’ gallery — for West Papuans a roll of honour — but which looks to 
outsiders disturbingly like a “hit list”. Indeed the first individual described is the 
late Chief Theys Eluay, who was murdered by Kopassus soldiers on 
November 10, 2001 in Jayapura. Surprisingly, and dishonestly, the author of 
the Anatomy has entered in Eluay’s bio-data that he was “kidnapped…….by 
an unknown person”.19 The six Kopassus soldiers responsible for killing Eluay 
were later found guilty only of mistreatment and battery leading to his death, 
not of murder. Indonesian Army General Ryamizard Ryacudu called the 
convicted men “Indonesian heroes” for killing a rebel. They were sentenced to 
between two and three and a half years jail. The “disappearance” of They’s 
driver, Aristoteles Masoka, was never investigated to the point of charges 
being laid and remains unresolved. 
It can be assumed that the 32 individuals who are highlighted in the Anatomy 
are seen as the leading Papuan “separatists” involved in the non-violent 
political sphere, the military leaders having already been identified. 
Geographically these individuals hail from right across the country, 
representing the highlands and coastal regions, urban areas and remote 
tribes. There are first generation leaders who have long been in opposition to 
Indonesia as well as many representatives of the second and also the 
“current” generation of student and youth activists. There are at least six 
Christian church leaders: Benny Giay, Herman Awom, Socrates Sofyan 
Yoman, Obet Komba, Ny Beatrix Koibur and Terryanus Yoku.  
The bio-data on these people relates mostly to political meetings, flag 
raisings, the formation of political groups such as FORERI,20 taking part in the 
Mubes of 2000,21 taking part in demonstrations and asking for political 
asylum. None of these actions was or is violent, and should not be considered 
illegal under Indonesia’s own civil and political rights laws and treaty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Slide 64 
20 FORERI: Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian Jaya Society, formed 24 July, 1998, 
Jayapura. 
21 Mubes: Musyawarah Besar, “Grand Consultation”, held in Jayapura, 24-27 February 2000. 
See Peter King, West Papua and Indonesia Since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy or 
Chaos? UNSW Press, Sydney, 2004, p.29ff. 
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obligations, which guarantee freedom of expression. While the OPM/TPN 
leaders have made a decision to take up arms against the state, and are 
therefore operating outside Indonesian law, civil society leaders have 
eschewed violence and their persecution is purely on political grounds.  
 
The last slide is number 96, “Known Activities” of the GSP/P. These actions 
and activities include: 
- [being] active in rallies rejecting Otsus, the military and PP7722 
leading to a referendum and secret meetings to complete 
plans/strategies for activities in the struggle for Papuan 
independence 
- [holding] press conferences/seminars and making pamphlets as a 
form of propaganda to publicize to the community that Papua is 
already independent & supported by the international community 
- [being] active in the commemoration of Papuan days 1st July (West 
Papua Sovereignty Day) and 1st December (West Papua 
Independence Day) to get sympathy from the international 
community 
- political lobbying of NGOs, congress and parliament members 
abroad advancing the issues of the failure of Otsus, human rights 
violations & the Act of Free Choice 
- flying the Morning Star flag in order to show the existence of a 
struggle and planning to form a team of 15 to ask for support for 
Papuan independence from Barack Obama (U.S. President) 
 
In most democracies these activities would be completely within the rights of 
citizens to pursue. That they have become criminalised in West Papua, and 
the subject of intense military intelligence scrutiny shows how seriously the 
Indonesian government takes the issue of Papuan “separatism”. 
It is interesting to note that four of the five activities listed are directed at (in 
the view of the author of the Anatomy) the international community, or 
members of it, such as President Barack Obama. This suggests that while the 
TNI are not particularly concerned by “separatists” as constituting a threat to 
order and control in Papua – the situation was described as “generally 
conducive” in slide 2 – they are very worried about how the issue will play out 
on the international stage. Indeed the fact that the very last words in the 
Anatomy are “U.S. President” would support this view. 
When Barack Obama was elected US President on 4 November 2008 there 
was great hope among Papuans that the first Black president might change 
US policy in favour of the West Papuans. This was not just a belief based on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Indonesian Regulation No. PP77/2007 bans the public display of “separatist symbols”. 
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colour sympathy. There are 40 Black US senators and congresspersons who 
have formed a group known as the “Black Caucus”, which, as the name 
suggests, looks after the interests of Black Americans. A leading figure in this 
group is American Samoan Congressman Eni Faleomavaega, who has a long 
history of being sympathetic towards the plight of the West Papuans and 
raising his concerns in international forums. However, if anything, the US has 
grown closer to Indonesia over the course of Obama’s presidency, as the US 
promotes the world’s largest Muslim nation and third largest democracy as a 
role model for the Islamic world. The election of Obama may well have been a 
catalyst for producing the Anatomy.  
Whatever the motivation for the production of the Anatomy, it is fortuitous for 
concerned observers of the West Papuan conflict. This document, like 
recently leaked WikiLeaks documents, confirms the nature of the military 
presence in West Papua, which must be characterised as a military 
occupation. The OPM/TPN is much more than a few ragtag rebels running 
around the bush, and the West Papuan nationalist movement is much more 
than a few “separatists”, according to the Anatomy (and most Papuans). The 
latter seems to include most of West Papuan civil society, certainly the 
leaders of the churches, the student movement, customary organisations, 
tribal organisations, regional organisations and even the MRP, the all-Papuan 
upper house created under the Special Autonomy legislation.  
The Anatomy could be viewed as a more detailed socio-political overview of 
Papuan resistance than has ever previously been undertaken. Obviously the 
Indonesian military has the freedom of movement and the resources, 
including a vast network of intelligence agents, to put the necessary data 
together. From our knowledge of the individuals, organisations and linkages 
canvassed, the great bulk of information contained in this Anatomy is broadly 
valid, if somewhat ahistorical. A striking exception is where the author tries to 
map foreign support for the Free Papua movement. Here the information is 
patchy, unreliable, and even flatly wrong. 
What is frightening about this document, besides that it identifies almost the 
entire West Papuan leadership (and by inference their followers, so therefore 
the bulk of the West Papuan population) as “separatists” and thus state 
enemies, is the complete lack of a policy to deal with the conflict beyond 
repression. There is no “hearts and minds” strategy here to win back the 
affection of the West Papuans. For the military, and by implication for the 
government in Jakarta, which has upheld the impunity of its security forces in 
West Papua unchallenged for two generations, there are no new policies 
worth the name in place at all, except continued surveillance, persecution, 
targeted assassination and restricting information flowing out to the 
international community, while cultivating and effectively corrupting a narrow 
stratum of elected and unelected Papuan officials and politicians. In other 
words, business as usual.  
The remainder of this report provides an analysis of the accompanying 
military files passed to us together with the Anatomy. These documents reveal 
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in detail the ways in which psychological warfare is used by the Indonesian 
security forces to maintain the Indonesian occupation of West Papua. 
 
Section 2: An Occupation of Fear: The Effects of 
PSYOPS in West Papua  
The Indonesian occupation of West Papua depends to a large degree on its 
redoubtable exercise of “PSYOPS” or “PSYWAR” – the psychological 
operations through which it has waged its almost five decades-long and 
largely covert war against the West Papuan people. The sensational set of 
secret TNI documents (of which the Anatomy is the outstanding one) outlining 
its enemies and operations in West Papua came to light in early 2011, 
demonstrating in formidable detail the range of PSYOPS techniques used 
against West Papuan individuals and communities on a daily basis, and 
revealing the other mechanisms by which the Indonesian occupation is 
maintained. 
 
Kopassus and the Takeover of West Papua 
Indonesia’s military infiltration and attempted seizure of West Papua from the 
Dutch in 1961-62 was effectuated, primarily, by its gruelingly trained Special 
Forces, the RPKAD (Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat), which came 
to be known eventually in 1986 as Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus). 
According to Ken Conboy: 
In a nation where the military has played an influential social and political role 
since its founding, perhaps no unit has wielded more power – and seen more 
combat – than Kopassus. ... From the jungles of Irian Jaya [sic] to the 
backrooms of Jakarta’s most powerful political figures, this elite group of 
commandos has influenced nearly every major policy decision taken since its 
inception in 1952.23 
Conboy contends that the Special Forces “were structured unlike anything 
else in the military” and that their presence in West Papua was, initially at 
least, “intended to win the hearts and minds of their targeted populace”.24 
However, the RPKAD/Kopassus encountered resistance from the beginning, 
with one team leader complaining, “The Papuans do not support us. They do 
not give us food; we must look for our own food or barter with our valuable 
equipment. They report on our movements to the Dutch”.25 West Papuan 
resistance has not subsided in the five decades since, and neither has the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ken Conboy, Kopassus: Inside Indonesia’s Special Forces, Equinox Publishing, Jakarta, 
2003. Quote is from back cover. Irian Jaya became Papua province in 2000. 
24 Ibid p. 70. 
25 Ibid pp. 74-5. 
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Indonesian government’s determination to occupy West Papua through ever-
expanding military deployments and widespread use of torture and other 
terrifying psychological operations. Euphemistically defined by the Inter-
American Defense Board as "the planned use of propaganda and other 
psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, 
emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to 
support the achievement of national objectives”,26 PSYOPS, as utilised by 
Kopassus and other elements of the Indonesian military in West Papua, has 
served to consolidate a simmering, occasionally boiling over, anti-Indonesian 
nationalism among the Papuans which is contained primarily through fear.  
 
What Are PSYOPS and How Do They Work? 
Paul Linebarger writes that PSYOPS involves “the supplementing of normal 
military operations by the use of mass communications”.27 As such, it 
“comprises the use of propaganda against an enemy, together with such 
military operational measures as may supplement the propaganda”.28 
According to communications expert Christopher Simpson, “since World War 
II, US military and NATO manuals have typically defined ‘psychological 
warfare’ or ‘psychological operations’ as tactics as varied as propaganda, 
covert operations, guerrilla warfare, and, more recently, public diplomacy”.29 
Simpson argues that, at its heart, “modern psychological warfare has been a 
tool for managing empire, not for settling conflicts in any fundamental sense. It 
has operated largely as a means to ensure that indigenous democratic 
initiatives in the Third World and Europe did not go ‘too far’”,30 which perhaps 
explains why psychological warfare so often fails to win occupied peoples’ 
hearts and minds in any meaningful fashion, including in West Papua where 
Papuans have chosen with good reason to resist the internal imperium and 
pseudo-democratic initiatives of Jakarta. Their reward so far is hinted at by 
Peter Watson, who writes that “fear, hate, deceit, pain, humiliation, loneliness, 
homesickness, envy, jealousy – this black side of human nature is the 
currency in which the psychological warfare specialist (or ‘psywarrior’ as he is 
sometimes known) trades”.31 
The units and functions of this currency, used to maximum effect by the TNI 
as evidenced in our set of leaked documents, comprise the focus of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Phil Taylor, Glossary of Relevant Terms and Acronyms: Propaganda and Psychological 
Warfare Studies, The Institute of Communication Studies, University of Leeds, 1987. 
Accessed, 17 May, 2010. Available at 
http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=64&paper=665. 
27 Paul Linebarger, Psychological Warfare, Arno Press, New York, 1972, p. 40. 
28 Ibid p. 25. 
29 Christopher Simpson. Science of Coercion: Communicative Research and Psychological 
Warfare 1945-1960, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 11. 
30 Ibid p. 8. 
31 Peter Watson. 1978. War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology. 
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remainder of this report. These documents from 2007 and 2008, remarkable 
in their intricacy of detail, even despite their many inaccuracies, include:  
• A comprehensive PowerPoint presentation titled Anatomy of Papuan 
Separatists (discussed in detail in the first half of this report); 
• A thick set of files on TNI agents based in Kotaraja, Jayapura, labeled 
Agents’ Biodata, detailing each agent’s potential for infiltrating various 
West Papuan resistance organisations; 
• A set of Secret Information Reports from Assistance Taskforce 5/Papua, 
Post I, Kotaraja. These reports feature information gleaned from TNI 
agents who have infiltrated various West Papuan community meetings, 
cultural events, church gatherings, political meetings and political 
demonstrations. An “informant’s analysis” is included at the end of each 
report; 
• An Excel spreadsheet of Recruitment Results: Conditions of Support from 
Taskforce 5, Post Kotaraja, from May-September 2007. This document 
lists co-opted West Papuan TNI agents’ perceptions of the West Papua-
Indonesia conflict; 
• A file on West Papuan TNI agents including photographs for each, as well 
as names, age, ethnicity, religion, occupation, address, marriage status, 
names of children, and personal characteristics; and 
• A PowerPoint documenting, through photographs, a series of West 
Papuan events attended by TNI troops, including: Monitoring Activities at 
District Churches in Illu, Presentation of Ideas About the Unitary State of 
the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI32) and Socialisation of Presidential 
Decree No.77, 10 December 2007 to Village Heads, Tribal Leaders and 
Pastors, Community Health Services and Treatment for the People of 
Jigonikme by Post-7 Illu, and Athletics with the People of Illu District. 
Drawing on these leaked files and other similar documents and related 
events, an analysis of the ways in which the TNI continues to carry out 
PSYOPS to maintain Indonesia’s occupation of West Papua follows. 
 
PSYOPS in West Papua 
Maintaining a military occupation through PSYOPS depends on the use of 
“white”, “gray” and “black” propaganda.33 White propaganda, “issued from an 
acknowledged source, usually a government or an agency of a government, 
[and] including military commands at various levels, ... is associated with overt 
psychological operations”.34 It “makes an overt appeal to the target 
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audience”.35 In West Papua, this amounts to the circulation of NKRI ideology 
with a positive spin, and the offering of various inducements to West Papuans 
to elicit their support. Gray propaganda “spreads the message favored by the 
source, but is issued in the name of some other entity”.36 In other words, in 
West Papua, Papuans or non-government/military agents are co-opted to 
uphold the Indonesian occupation. Black propaganda is “the most deceptive 
form; ... messages are issued in the name of the source’s enemy”.37 This 
includes forging documents, infiltration of the opposition, the spreading of 
rumours and other methods—all familiar in West Papua as part of strategies 
of inducement, co-option and coercion.38 
Inducement 
“A strategy of inducement provides resources to the occupied population in an 
effort to buy its acquiescence”.39 Despite limited success, the TNI still 
engages such “white propaganda” tactics in attempts to win the hearts and 
minds of West Papuans. Such tactics are demonstrated in perhaps their most 
benign manifestation in the leaked TNI document that depicts troops visiting 
various highlands Papuan communities. One slide in a PowerPoint 
presentation under the heading Community Health Services and Treatment 
for the People of Jigonikme by Post-7 Illu shows a soldier in civilian attire 
feeding an infant in its mother’s arms using a plastic spoon, and another 
providing a child with a drink, in a makeshift clinic. In another slide titled 
Athletics with the People of Illu District troops are on a highlands soccer field 
with Papuan villagers kicking a ball around and posing for photos. Each of 
these scenarios depict obvious attempts by the TNI to bond with the local 
people by offering simple health care services, or participating in community 
sporting activities. 
Yet a different sentiment is apparent in other photos within the same 
PowerPoint file, particularly in one slide with the heading, Results of 
Presenting Presidential Decree No. 77 10 December 2007 to the Community, 
in which one solider cameos in three scenarios: in the first photograph he 
stares straight ahead at the camera shaking the hand of a seated, older 
Papuan man whose head is slightly bowed in apparent unease; in the second 
photograph this soldier sits with his arm around a young Papuan man who 
stares at the ground, smoking a cigarette and looking unhappy; and, in the 
third photo, the same soldier stands above a group of seated Papuans 
holding a rifle, while another soldier sits in front of him holding a machete, with 
his arm slung around an uncomfortably-huddled Papuan woman. Each of 
these images suggests that the activities of “inducement” engaged in by 
Indonesian troops together with Papuan communities involve a power 
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differential in which the Papuans, grateful for the services (or afraid of 
appearing ungrateful), in return tolerate the presence of the troops. Thus it is 
not clear how far such “inducements” achieve the Indonesian-intended 
outcome of winning Papuans to the NKRI ideology. This is particularly so 
given that in December 2010 it was revealed that a troop from Kostrad (the 
army's Strategic Reserve Command), 
Army Second Lieutenant Cosmos, commander of Kolome Post in Illu District, 
Papua, has been found guilty of torturing civilians and sentenced to four 
months in prison. ... Cosmos was charged with torturing a number of people 
living in Puncak Jaya, Papua, last March. Meanwhile, Private FC Sahminan 
Husain Lubis, Private Joko Sulistiono and Private Dwi Purwanto, have been 
sentenced to three months jail time for the same offence.40 
Another of the leaked documents reveals details reported by Assistance 
Taskforce-5 at Post 1, Kotaraja, of preparations for the celebration of 
Indonesia’s 62nd Independence Day in Abepura District, Jayapura. Of the 
three advisors to the organising committee, one was the Area Military (Ramil) 
Commander. The white propagandistic PSYOPS activities planned included 
“painting the main road and walls”, a “mini-football match”, a “sepak takraw 
[kick volleyball] match in front of the District office”, children’s competitions 
such as “shrimp cracker eating”, and raising the “red/white [Indonesian flag]”. 
However, there are more coercive aspects to these ostensibly community-
building events, as evidenced in a file note that reads, “there are still houses 
which have not yet raised Indonesian flags, ... [despite] the order that it is 
compulsory to raise the Indonesian flag from the Abepura District beginning 
14 August 2007 from morning until night during the celebration of Indonesian 
Independence Day”.  An accompanying photograph with these file notes 
depicts a street wall painted with an Indonesian flag, around which is written 
“NKRI Harga Mati” – NKRI even at the cost of death. 
PSYOPS inducements, or bribes, have also been used to detrimental effect 
by the TNI against West Papuan people. As military analyst Watson has 
pointed out, a common PSYOPS technique is to study one’s enemies’ 
vulnerabilities and manipulate their points of weakness.41 Markus Haluk, a 
West Papuan independence activist whose activities are closely monitored 
and frequently noted by the TNI in these files, has remarked: “Special 
Autonomy is another form of subjugation through money—local officials are 
allocated so much money they [have] lost their integrity and dignity [through] 
excessive drinking [and by] ... spreading HIV/AIDS”.42  
Papuans have remarked that a self-perceived weakness of Papuan men for 
alcohol, money and women has meant that they have been easily seduced by 
all three in exchange for betraying their own ultimate interests and working for 
corrupt Indonesian interests in West Papua.43 This has been a source of 
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shame and anxiety within West Papuan indigenous community organisations 
that are working for peace, justice and independence.44 All of these examples 
have demonstrated that the TNI excels at “strategic and tactical propaganda”, 
but, to borrow the words of Linebarger’s textbook, they have “never solved the 
problem of consolidation propaganda. ... They [have never] won the real 
loyalty of the peoples whom they [keep attempting to] conquer”.45 
 
Co-option  
Successful strategies of accommodation co-opt local elites into the 
occupation project. Those elites come to see the occupation as a means for 
ensuring their own position of power within the occupied territory both during 
and after the occupation. Ideally for an occupying power, these elites, in turn, 
convince the occupied population to suppress its nationalism and accept the 
... occupation.46 
Edelstein’s description of co-option as a technique of gray propagandistic 
PSYOPS is an apt analysis of the official process of pemekaran (division) in 
West Papua, whereby the Papua and Papua Barat provinces are increasingly 
divided into smaller units of administration. Pemekaran allows for the further 
subdivision and absorption of Special Autonomy money and power by local 
elites, as well as the further proliferation of military commands, and is seen by 
many Papuans and analysts as a “divide and rule” strategy by Jakarta to co-
opt and corrupt Papuan community leaders, dissuading them from resisting 
Jakarta’s occupation.47 
In a more direct manner, the TNI uses co-option as an occupation strategy to 
infiltrate Papuan resistance networks. As in Aceh, where “’infiltration’ 
cover[ed] the ‘turning’ of GAM [Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or Free Aceh 
Movement] members, usually upon compromise from interrogations, 
searches, capture, and coercion [of] family members”,48 so too in Papua, the 
TNI employs indigenous Papuans, even former OPM guerrilla members, for 
resistance network infiltration. Based in Port Vila, Vanuatu, exiled OPM 
member and Vice-chairman of the West Papua National Coalition for 
Liberation, Otto Ondawame, writes that these “turned” Papuans “are often 
more dangerous than the real enemy because they can infiltrate local society 
and orchestrate protests and rallies”.49  
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Ondawame’s concerns are confirmed in the leaked TNI file that provides 
information about Papuan secret agents who are used as spies by the 
military. Each agent listed in the Kotaraja area is given a profile, with notes on 
their various personality characteristics and capacities. For example, one 23 
year-old male, originally from Biak, “has potential to feign in joining the 
activities of Markus Haluk and Buktar Tabuni” (currently imprisoned for 
“inciting hatred toward the government”50). Another agent could “provide 
information about the campus students’ movement”. Another can provide 
“information about the activities of press conferences and demonstrations”. 
One agent working as a rental car driver “often provides information if there is 
someone from GSP [OPM] group that rents a car and talks about ‘M’”.51  
An agent who works at a telephone credit counter “often helps by providing 
cell phone numbers for those buying phone credit [at his shop]”. Other agents 
in Puncak Jaya are variously described as “stubborn and egotistical in 
defending ... opinions”; “available to mobilize the masses for whatever is 
needed by Post Illu”; persuaded to work because of “material motives”, and of 
“sour disposition” and “indolent” - yet possessing “high mobility” and influence 
with officials. Another agent is described thus: “his weakness is that he is 
often drunk, but it can still be controlled”. One village head was apparently 
able to be co-opted by the TNI because he “was ill-treated by [Goliat Tabuni’s 
group] for not providing funds or logistical assistance, to the point that he ... 
developed a personal resistance to them” – thus his allegiances were 
manipulated. In another example, a young Papuan man, who is described as 
“slightly shy [but] smiles readily”, is used because he is “looked up to by his 
friends”, and has useful connections as he “often goes to the forest to search 
for wood”.  
These Papuan spies are then used by the TNI to attend West Papuan events 
and report back on resistance activities and plans. Information such as the 
following is attributed to “earnest” informants: 
a. On Thursday, 16 August 2007 at 19.30 (Eastern Indonesian Time) at 
Adonai restaurant in a shopping center in Jayapura, Markus Haluk 
received a donation from a member of Papua’s Provincial Legislature 
(DPRP Papua) in the name of Dr. _ _ (from _ _)52 of Rp. 5.000.000 
possibly for his trip to Jakarta. 
b. On Friday, 17 August 2007, at 9.00 (Eastern Indonesian Time) Markus 
Haluk flew to Jakarta on a Merpati flight in order to lead a rally at the 
Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR RI) planned for Monday 20 
August 2007 with an unknown number of people. Their planned demands 
are to ask for a special session to implement a national dialogue and hear 
opinions. If any of their demands are not met by the government, they will 
sleep at the DPR RI [the lower house of parliament in Jakarta] and 
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conduct a boycott of the 2009 general elections by mobilizing people from 
the central highlands. 
c. On Friday, 17 August at 14.30 (Eastern Indonesian Time) at the AMPTI 
secretariat office in Perumnas I, Waena which is also the home of Buktar 
Tabuni, Rev Socrates Sofyan Yoman53 came to give a donation of money 
to Buktar Tabuni, which was inside of an envelope so the amount is 
unknown. 
Many similar examples fill the pages of these documents, evidencing the 
close monitoring of West Papuan independence leaders by co-opted West 
Papuan TNI agents. “Strategically”, writes Davies, in relation to the actions of 
the TNI in Aceh, “’infiltration’ applies also to the creation and sponsorship of 
so-called ‘splinter’ groups to undermine GAM and its civilian support 
networks, especially overseas”.54 Indonesia has done this in West Papua too, 
co-opting renowned and politically savvy West Papuan independence activists 
to work, very publicly, for Indonesian ends. In Davies’ words, “’PSYOPS’ here 
denotes Jakarta’s more sensitive, sophisticated, and aggressive manipulation 
of perceptions, but at strategic levels beyond such counterintelligence 
activit[ies]”, as described by him above.55 
For example, high profile West Papuan former independence leaders 
Franzalbert Joku and Nicolaus Messet are now strident NKRI advocates. 
Each extols the virtues of Indonesia’s Special Autonomy Law (claimed by 
most Papuans to be a spectacular failure), and together they have formed the 
group IGSSARPRI – the Independent Group Supporting Autonomous Region 
of Papua in the Republic of Indonesia. This group is active, with Indonesia’s 
financial backing,56 in trying to repatriate West Papuan refugees living in 
Papua New Guinea. Being skilled orators, Joku and Messet are sent by 
Indonesia as “West Papuan representatives” to international forums such as 
the September 2010 US Congress Subcommittee hearing in Washington, DC, 
on Crimes Against Humanity: When Will Indonesia’s Military Be Held 
Accountable for Deliberate and Systematic Abuses in West Papua?, and the 
University of Sydney’s Comprehending West Papua conference in Sydney  
during February 2011, to pursue Indonesian ends. At the former forum which 
was convened for West Papuan activists to present their appeals against 
Indonesia, Messet professed to represent an “independent and privately 
funded group [IGSARPRI] dedicated [to] collaborating with all institutions and 
individuals whoever they may be, including the government of Indonesia, to 
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creating a just, peaceful and prosperous society in the nation of Indonesia, 
inclusive of Papua”.57 He then entreated that  
[the] United States House of Representatives and the United States 
administration under the leadership of President Barack Hussein Obama, as 
a matter of regional and international strategic priority, reaffirm and 
strengthen the comprehensive partnership arrangement between the United 
States and the Republic of Indonesia without further delay.58 
The Government of Indonesia has previously, in Aceh, according to Davies, 
used “turned” Acehnese GAM members to carry out similar public relations 
PSYOPS stunts to discredit GAM’s aims. In doing so, it has used such 
stooges to “usurp ... [the Indonesian Government’s] GAM target ... by posing 
as the latter during formal discussions with Estonia, the USA, and 
elsewhere”,59 “[and] by affect[ing] a certain media sophistication and political 
intellect in the activist and diplomatic circles, ... repeatedly interdicting foreign 
media and academics seeking direct contact with GAM”.60 
In a further effort to discredit the OPM, the TNI has attempted to paint the 
West Papuan resistance as “terrorists” on the world stage, as they did with 
GAM.61 PSYOPS tactics to this end have included referring to the OPM as a 
“wild terrorist gang” (Gerombolan Pengacau Liar)62 and  “attributing civilian 
killings and other crimes to enemy action or ‘crossfire’”.63 This includes, for 
example, the murder of two American schoolteachers and an Indonesian on 
the road to the Freeport mine below Tembagapura, West Papua, in 2002, for 
which West Papuan OPM member Antonius Wamang was sentenced to life in 
prison even though, during initial police investigations by the Jayapura police, 
the TNI were suspected;64 and the shooting of Australian Drew Grant in 2009 
near the Freeport mine, which was used to justify, on unsubstantiated 
evidence, the manhunt and murder of TPN commander Kelly Kwalik by the 
Indonesian police anti-terror unit, Densus 88, and the police mobile brigade, 
Brimob.65 
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Coercion 
Former Kopassus commander Lt. Gen. (ret.) Prabowo Subianto (who was 
“forced to retire because of his involvement in the kidnapping, torture, and 
murder of democracy activists in early 1998”66) has argued: 
Indonesian culture is very violent and the military is a mirror of society. ... This 
whole culture in Indonesia is a culture of violence between tribes and ethnic 
groups. ...This is something that we are aware of, something we do not like, 
and something that we would like to address, to control, and to manage. But it 
is there: fighting between families, fighting between villages, fighting between 
tribes, fighting between ethnic groups, and finally fighting between religions.67 
Scholar Fuller Collins argues that views such as Prabowo’s are publicly 
propounded “by ... Indonesian elites ... to suit other purposes. ... These 
arguments are useful to elites”, she contends, “who make them to mobilize 
people behind campaigns for a return to order and stability as a means of 
protecting their own interests against groups demanding land rights, higher 
wages, and political reform”,68 thus legitimising military violence as a means 
of achieving state ends. This includes, in West Papua, the practice of 
coercion, which, as defined by Edelstein, “is the use or threatened use of 
military force to defeat any elements of the population that resist or threaten to 
resist an occupation”.69 PSYOPS, in this sense, is “an instrument for 
maintaining grossly abusive social structures”.70 It succeeds, Edelstein writes, 
by 
…essentially “clearing the decks” of any opposition to the occupation, making 
room for the occupying power and any supporters it has to implement 
occupation reforms. In Northern Korea, for example, the coercive occupation 
strategy after World War II used the latent threat of violence and 
imprisonment. ... Once [unhappy] citizens were incarcerated, killed or chased 
away, the threat environment [for the occupier] had improved.71 
Disseminating threats to West Papuan independence activists, via SMS, 
telephone calls, and the leaving of nasty “souvenirs” are well-known tactics of 
coercion utilised by the Indonesian security forces in West Papua. Markus 
Haluk writes in a 2009 report that “Mental or psychological terror is 
systematically used in some of the following ways”:  
A short message (SMS) is sent, a telephone call where no-one answers, the 
distribution of papers and posters in the street and public places, ... the 
incitement of some individuals against others, ... [or] Police and Brimob 
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making a scene simulating a hostage taking [for example] on Friday 20 
February in the mall of Papua Trade Centre.72 
In this report, Haluk tables, for the record, a series of SMS threats that have 
been received by other Papuan resistance leaders as well as by himself. 
Some examples: 
• “Hey coward, it would be better if you killed yourself. You Papuans 
will never get freedom even if you live 1000 years”. 
• “Your God is the devil and you will not live much longer. It would be 
good if you would wash, you mangy dog”. 
• “Hey Markus Haluk, ... you go to special meetings with KNPB 
[National Committee of West Papua] for your own self interest. But 
you will soon be dead. You are trying to beat us, but you are just a 
traitor, a pig, a dog”. 
• “Our cameras are watching you. You are in our focus”.73 
When Ardiansyah Matra, a journalist in Merauke, West Papua, who was 
reporting on the controversial Merauke Food Estate Project near local election 
time, was found dead in the Gudang Arang River on July 30, 2010, it was 
discovered that he had previously received a number of SMS threats 
regarding his work. Following his death, a journalist colleague in Merauke 
reported that she had received threats via a blood-stained letter, and a further 
two colleagues subsequently reported that they too had received SMS death 
threats for their investigative journalistic work, one of which read: 
The drums of war are ready, with masses to be deployed one by one, we will 
slaughter Merauke which is primed to be smeared in the blood of Indonesian 
Armed Forces (TNI) and police personnel until they are wiped out hahaha. 
Journalist cowards, never play with fire if you don’t want to get burnt. 
Because fire will burn your whole body. If you still want to eat in this land, do 
not do strange things. We have recorded all of your details and get ready to 
be massacred hahaha.74 
West Papuan refugees Benny Wenda, now living in Oxford, the UK, and 
Jacob Rumbiak, now in Melbourne, Australia, have both continued to receive 
threats via telephone and SMS, even in their new countries of residence. In 
an email to the authors, Wenda described how 
Sometimes I receive telephone calls from people pretending to be Papuan. 
But they are not really Papuan. When I ask their name and which tribe they 
are from they never answer my questions. I have also felt threatened through 
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the blogs and email. Pro Indonesian blogs have run slur campaigns against 
myself and my family”.75 
 Rumbiak has revealed that he has received threats, via SMS and telephone, 
saying, inter alia: “We will paralyze you and your network overseas”.76 
Thus, by utilising channels of communication to issue threats against those 
working for justice in West Papua, Indonesian security forces confirm 
Simpson’s analysis that: 
In practice modern psychological warfare and propaganda have only rarely 
offered “alternatives” to violence over the medium-to-long term. Instead, they 
have been an integral part of a strategy and culture whose premise [is] the 
rule of the strong at the expense of the weak, where coercion and 
manipulation pose as “communication” and close off opportunities for other, 
more genuine, forms of understanding.77 
The intentional circulation of petrifying rumours is another “black propaganda” 
tactic used by Indonesian security forces to cause “trouble, confusion ... and 
terror” in West Papuan communities,78 and thus to maintain psychological 
control. Scholar Eva-Lotta Hedman writes, “It is clear that political terror in 
Indonesia involves a politics of suspicion that is at once transparent and 
occult”.79 She recounts allegations that Kopassus planted the rumour of a 
Dracula roaming the streets of Jayapura at night in the local newspaper 
Cenderawasih Pos several days before the evening in November 2001 that 
Kopassus troops assassinated West Papuan independence leader Theys 
Eluay. This Dracula had supposedly already killed two children, and the 
rumour effectively left Jayapura’s streets empty and therefore free of 
witnesses to Eluay’s abduction and subsequent assassination.80 
The efficacy of the Dracula rumour is described by Hedman thus: 
In post-Suharto Indonesia, paranoia has become a distinct kind of political 
discourse, one in which politicians, military officers, journalists, and reformers 
equally engage. In this paranoid politics, the Dracula is simultaneously a 
political metaphor, a political tool, and a political reality. As a political 
metaphor, the Dracula is used to critique those in power. As a political tool, 
the Dracula is seemingly employed with the intention to terrorize citizens and 
shroud political crimes in obscurity; and as a political reality, the Dracula is 
able to cause social anxiety and empty town streets.81 
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The spreading of rumours such as the Dracula one in Jayapura is a popular 
PSYOPS technique world-wide. For example, in 1962, as part of their 
offensive tactics in their conflict with Cuba, the US proposed to spread  
the word [in Cuba] that the Second Coming of Christ was imminent and that 
Christ was against Castro [who] was anti-Christ. ... [Then] just over the 
horizon there would be an American submarine which would surface off of 
Cuba and send up some starshells. And this would be the manifestation of 
the Second Coming and Castro would be overthrown.82  
Finally, the threatening presence of Kopassus and other security forces, made 
known to West Papuans through intimidating and intrusive surveillance, is an 
aspect of PSYOPS that contributes to the constant oppression of Papuans. 
Benny Wenda describes how he feels that his “life has been controlled by 
someone else. Even living in my own land”, he explains, “I always felt that I 
[was] a slave with my own people in my own land. Because I don’t have any 
freedom or any right to voice my political belief in my own country”.83  
Similarly, Jacob Rumbiak writes: “Psychologically, chronic oppression causes 
depression and a feeling of powerlessness”.84 From the TNI houses that are 
wedged between Papuan houses in Papuan villages and TNI checkpoints at 
the entrance to villages, to the strategic placement of terrifying statues of 
Kopassus troops in public places, West Papuans are made to feel the 
presence of Indonesian security forces in their everyday activities. One of the 
authors observed during a visit to West Papua in 2008 that Indonesian troops 
even monitored church services (as depicted in one of the leaked TNI 
PowerPoint files) and church-provided clinics. Further asserting their 
presence, the TNI commonly take early morning runs, singing nationalistic 
songs loudly as they jog (this was observed numerous times by one of the 
authors in 2008 in West Papua—see Photograph 2, below). This practice is 
also common in Java, but in West Papua it is particularly disturbing as it 
serves as a reminder at the beginning of the day of who exercises authority in 
the public arena in West Papua. 
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Photo 1: TNI troops with second-hand 
clothes brought by a Merauke church to 
villagers, 2008 (Photo: Camellia Webb-
Gannon) 
Photo 2: TNI troops singing loudly while 
jogging past a church in Merauke, 2008 
(Photo: Camellia Webb-Gannon) 
According to Watson, “crowd-control is probably the most-used psychological 
counter-insurgency technique. ... The effects of police formations and actions 
on crowds and the use of special equipment and techniques ... produce 
desired effects”.85 This technique is exercised frequently in West Papua by 
security forces via “sweeps” of towns and villages searching for “separatist” 
materials or weapons on politically important West Papuan dates such as 
December 1st (West Papuan national day),86 and the turning out en masse of 
security forces to incite awe and fear. For example, when in Wamena in 2008, 
one of the authors was witness to the sudden and unnerving show of 
approximately 20 open backed police and army vehicles, packed with at least 
ten troops and officers each, driving around the town with their sirens blaring, 
then parading before shutting down a West Papuan church-opening 
ceremony (see Photograph 3). That “the surprise appearance of a large unit 
of specially equipped police in full view of the mob can have a huge 
psychological impact”87 was confirmed by this author in Wamena when one of 
the rapidly scattering crowd of celebrators whispered that the security forces 
shut down the town and cut off roads like this regularly as a drill. 
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Photograph 3: Police and Army turn out en masse to shut down a church 
celebration in Wamena, 2008 (Photo: Camellia Webb-Gannon) 
 
Short and Long Term Effects of PSYOPS 
The short-term effects of PSYOPS on West Papuan communities are more 
easily visible, although the long-term effects are just as detrimental. Torture 
and politically motivated murder of West Papuans by security forces have 
both the immediate effect of silencing the victim and the longer-term effect of 
spreading fear among communities, which forces resistance activities 
underground and causes psychological distress. Scholar of West Papua, and 
former director of the Catholic Office of Justice and Peace in Jayapura, Budi 
Hernawan, has analysed the practice of torture in West Papua. Hernawan 
draws on Foucault: 
Torture [in Papua] is performed as a public event and thus reaches the maximum 
terrifying impact on the social body. This is the ultimate goal of the public display 
of the injured body. It is not only to inflict agonizing pain and suffering over the 
individual but, more importantly, to ensure that the whole social body witnesses 
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the real power of the sovereign as inscribed over the abject. This message has to 
be very clear to the public to complete the whole torture ritual.88 
This public dimension of torture, intended as a message to the West Papuan 
body politic, is evident in the video-phone recording of several of the recent 
high-profile torture cases in West Papua, including the brutal cutting open of 
West Papuan Yawan Wayeni with a bayonet by Brimob in 2009; and the 
burning of the genitals, hog tying and suffocating (although not to death) of 
another West Papuan man in 2010. Political warnings have also been sent to 
the West Papuan public through the kidnapping and sexual assault of Yane 
Waromi, the daughter of a West Papuan independence figure, Edison 
Waromi89; the 2001 assassination of Theys Eluay by Kopassus; the 2009 
assassination of Kelly Kwalik by Brimob and Densus 88 police, and the 2001 
murder of Willem Onde, an OPM unit leader in Asiki, Merauke, who had also 
(like Theys Eluay) enjoyed favours from Kopassus. 
West Papuans believe that the long-term oppression of Papuans through 
PSYOPS tactics can lead to incapacitation and even death. Two prominent 
examples illustrate this. The first is the 2011 death of the former chair of the 
MRP (Majelis Rakyat Papua--West Papua’s all-Papuan upper house) Agus 
Alua, which occurred hours after he learned that his reappointment to the 
second MRP body had been vetoed by Jakarta. Reverend Benny Giay, head 
of the Kingmi (indigenous West Papuan) church, asserts that the reason Alua 
was excluded from the new committee by the Government of Indonesia was 
because of his controversial views, particularly his 2010 call on behalf of the 
MRP for a referendum on West Papua’s status.90 Giay believes that the shock 
of this realisation contributed in no small way to his sudden death, and thus 
that his death can be read as a “crime against the basic rights of the Papuan 
people and against their rejection of Special Autonomy”.91 Similarly, the 
debilitating stroke suffered by John Rumbiak, a brilliant West Papuan human 
rights advocate, in February 2005, came after he experienced numerous 
death threats over a period of several years, indicating that the psychological 
pressure of oppression proved too much to withstand.92 This is consistent with 
torture and trauma expert Benham Behnia’s assertion that: 
War and torture are extraordinary, uncontrollable, and unpredictable events. 
The stress caused by these events can exceed the individual’s ability to 
adapt. Victims feel powerless because they have no control over or ability to 
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anticipate the course of events. ... The intentional nature of war and torture 
makes them particularly distressing, because the survivor’s injury is not an 
accident; it is the direct result of conscious and malicious actions by others.93 
Benhia continues, explaining how “extreme situations caused by war and 
torture also call into question connections, such as kinship, friendship, and the 
sense of community, that link individuals to each other. Painful breaches of 
trust by relatives, neighbours and friends can make it difficult for survivors to 
trust other people and to feel secure in their company”.94 Jacob Rumbiak can 
attest to this, claiming that, “during the 11 years I have lived in Australia, I 
have been followed by Australian intelligence agents, in co-operation [with] 
Indonesian intelligence agents, as well as other foreign organisations”.95 And 
Benny Wenda similarly describes how, when he was in West Papua, 
Indonesia always followed whatever I [did] and wherever I [went], intimidating, 
spying on me. Indonesian intelligence [was] always [at] every meeting, church 
meeting, to always follow you around. If you [were an] activist or leader for 
your people, you never felt free. Sometimes [we were even] embarrassed 
ourselves to be Papuan, because we are being watch[ed] all the time.96 
 
Conclusion 
The leaked TNI documents which we have been analysing, complete with 
“x’s” targeting the photographed figures of West Papuan independence 
leaders in some of the dossiers, are shocking not in so much as they offer 
new revelations about the viciousness of Indonesia’s PSYWAR in West 
Papua, but, rather, in their revelation of the level of research detail and 
resources that the TNI dedicates to waging the war. As discussed in the first 
section of this report, these TNI files constitute the most significant stock-take 
of OPM/TPN forces ever undertaken, and not surprisingly so given the 
considerable comparative advantage of resources and freedom of movement 
enjoyed by Indonesian security in West Papua in relation to indigenous 
Papuans. The Anatomy of Separatists document is chilling in its 
comprehensiveness, revealing the work of a tightly knit network of Indonesian 
intelligence agents ranged against a systematically researched (if not always 
accurate) list of what are considered to be state enemies, including West 
Papuan church leaders.  
Significantly, nearly every important West Papuan leader, civil and military 
alike, is targeted in this document as an separatist, indicating that if these 
leaders accurately represent the will of the people they lead, then the majority 
of the West Papuan body politic is in effect seen by the TNI as being a 
collective enemy of the state. While this does not bode well for West Papuans 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Behnam Behnia, “Trust Building from the Perspective of Survivors of War and Torture,” 
Social Service Review, March 2004, p. 27 
94 Ibid p. 27. 
95 Rumbiak op. cit. 
96 Wenda op. cit. 
	   	   	  
	   	   36	  
	  
who must live under an Indonesian occupation that perceives them as such, it 
does add solid evidence to West Papuans’ claims against the legitimacy of 
Indonesia’s governance. The short and the long term effects of the PSYOPS 
tactics are painfully familiar to West Papuans – what is important about these 
documents having come to light is that they constitute solid proof of TNI intent 
to oppress and terrorise West Papuans. Markus Haluk has commented that 
as a West Papuan leader he is constantly under observation … 
day and night. Whe[ther] incoming [or] outgoing, I am always on guard and 
monitored by the security forces and military who w[ear] civilian clothes. ... 
They [use] vegetable sellers, shoe sellers, meatballs sellers, watch sellers 
and other sellers ... [to] continuously come to sell at my residence. Their 
purpose is only ... to check the existence and activities I do.97  
How does he feel living under Indonesian occupation?  “I feel like [I am] living 
at the zoo, ... surrounded by lions and tigers [that have a] ferocious hunger for 
meat, ... Indonesia’s Papua[n] ... human flesh. This situation, ... when will it 
end?”.98 
A recent report by Indonesian human rights watchdog Imparsial, titled Human 
Rights Implications of the Military Presence in Papua: From the Old Order to 
the Reform Era, which is based on “interviews with residents of Papua, 
officials and high-ranking military officers assigned to the province”, urges 
the de-militarization of Papua to be conducted soon because the military 
approach only brings human rights violations. ... Since the country’s so-called 
reform era, ... human rights conditions in the region had been marked by 
intimidation, torture and sexual violence.99  
The executive director of Imparsial has contended that “the military presence 
was serving as a psychological obstacle for Papua’s development”, and that it 
is critical for the sake of peace in West Papua that the 15,000 troops stationed 
there be reduced. The central Indonesian government needs to shift from less 
of a focus on “separatists”, to more of a focus on development, according to 
Imparsial researchers.100 
The global community, including governments, politicians, academics, and 
human rights organisations, has a responsibility to act on this evidence and to 
mitigate the decades of psychological terror and physical trauma experienced 
by West Papuan individuals and communities at the hands of Indonesian 
security forces. A crucial step in this direction would be to end any type of 
training or funding by Australia of Kopassus forces in particular. As recently as 
September 2010, Australia’s elite SAS forces were involved in 
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counterterrorism training with Kopassus in Indonesia,101 which the US-based 
Human Rights Watch says “undermines the push for reform”, as "very few 
people from Kopassus have been investigated, convicted and served 
appropriate sentences for serious crimes”.102 If Australia sets the example, 
then perhaps the United States, which, in 2010, resumed its security aid to 
Kopassus under President Obama after a 12-year moratorium on such 
assistance, might follow suit. Without the implicit and now explicit backing of 
regional and world powers, the TNI’s terror stronghold in West Papua would 
be considerably weakened.
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This report is dedicated to the memory of Agus Alue Alua. Alua was 
committed to working for peace with justice in West Papua, serving as the first 
chairperson of the MRP – the all-Papuan upper house – with a spirit of 
integrity and collaboration. He died in hospital on April 7, 2011, after learning 
that the Indonesian government had decided not to reappoint him to the MRP.  
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About the West Papua Project 
This project seeks to promote peaceful dialogue between the people of West 
Papua and Indonesia, and to promote conflict resolution as a viable 
alternative to the current and escalating conflict. 
 
Objectives 
• Establish relevant links with concerned NGOs, academics and 
parliamentarians in Australia, West Papua and Indonesia. The resulting 
networks will serve as a conduit for the dissemination of public 
information and as a key source of support for conflict resolution 
• Raise public awareness of the conflict between West Papua and 
Indonesia with particular reference to the human rights implications and 
the threat to the stability of the South Pacific region. 
 
Project description 
This project aims to put in place concrete strategies near achieve the goal of 
peaceful dialogue between Indonesia and West Papua. These strategies will 
consist of strengthening networks, addressing the information deficit on West 
Papua through research and a public awareness campaign, and promoting 
education on conflict resolution. 
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